Mac Pro can be configured with up to 8TB of fast NVMe-based SSD storage. SSD storage delivers significantly improved performance compared with a traditional hard drive — speed you will notice when you start up your Mac Pro, launch an application, open a big project, or tackle data-intensive tasks. In terms of standard gigabytes, 1GiB ≈ 1.074GB and refers to the actual formatted capacity of shown under Mac OS 10.5 or earlier and Microsoft Windows OS. Specific application environments such as temperature and duty cycle will affect the overall reliability rates. Based on SandForce processor operation. Specifications provided by SandForce.
In computer security, mandatory access control (MAC) refers to a type of access control by which the operating system or database constrains the ability of a subject or initiator to access or generally perform some sort of operation on an object or target.[1] In the case of operating systems, a subject is usually a process or thread; objects are constructs such as files, directories, TCP/UDP ports, shared memory segments, IO devices, etc. Subjects and objects each have a set of security attributes. Whenever a subject attempts to access an object, an authorization rule enforced by the operating system kernel examines these security attributes and decides whether the access can take place. Any operation by any subject on any object is tested against the set of authorization rules (aka policy) to determine if the operation is allowed. A database management system, in its access control mechanism, can also apply mandatory access control; in this case, the objects are tables, views, procedures, etc.
With mandatory access control, this security policy is centrally controlled by a security policy administrator; users do not have the ability to override the policy and, for example, grant access to files that would otherwise be restricted. By contrast, discretionary access control (DAC), which also governs the ability of subjects to access objects, allows users the ability to make policy decisions and/or assign security attributes. (The traditional Unix system of users, groups, and read-write-execute permissions is an example of DAC.) MAC-enabled systems allow policy administrators to implement organization-wide security policies. Under MAC (and unlike DAC), users cannot override or modify this policy, either accidentally or intentionally. This allows security administrators to define a central policy that is guaranteed (in principle) to be enforced for all users.
Historically and traditionally, MAC has been closely associated with multilevel security (MLS) and specialized military systems. In this context, MAC implies a high degree of rigor to satisfy the constraints of MLS systems. More recently, however, MAC has deviated out of the MLS niche and has started to become more mainstream. The more recent MAC implementations, such as SELinux and AppArmor for Linux and Mandatory Integrity Control for Windows, allow administrators to focus on issues such as network attacks and malware without the rigor or constraints of MLS.
Historical background and implications for multilevel security[edit]
Historically, MAC was strongly associated with multilevel security (MLS) as a means of protecting US classified information. The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), the seminal work on the subject, provided the original definition of MAC as 'a means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and the formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity'.[2] Early implementations of MAC such as Honeywell's SCOMP, USAF SACDIN, NSA Blacker, and Boeing's MLS LAN focused on MLS to protect military-oriented security classification levels with robust enforcement.
The term mandatory in MAC has acquired a special meaning derived from its use with military systems. In this context, MAC implies an extremely high degree of robustness that assures that the control mechanisms can resist any type of subversion, thereby enabling them to enforce access controls that are mandated by order of a government such as the Executive Order 12958 for US classified information. Enforcement is supposed to be more imperative than for commercial applications. This precludes enforcement by best-effort mechanisms; only mechanisms that can provide absolute or near-absolute enforcement of the mandate are acceptable for MAC. This is a tall order and sometimes assumed unrealistic by those unfamiliar with high assurance strategies, and very difficult for those who are.
Strength[edit]
Degrees[edit]
In some systems, users have the authority to decide whether to grant access to any other user. To allow that, all users have clearances for all data. This is not necessarily true of an MLS system. If individuals or processes exist that may be denied access to any of the data in the system environment, then the system must be trusted to enforce MAC. Since there can be various levels of data classification and user clearances, this implies a quantified scale for robustness. For example, more robustness is indicated for system environments containing classified Top Secret information and uncleared users than for one with Secret information and users cleared to at least Confidential. To promote consistency and eliminate subjectivity in degrees of robustness, an extensive scientific analysis and risk assessment of the topic produced a landmark benchmark standardization quantifying security robustness capabilities of systems and mapping them to the degrees of trust warranted for various security environments. The result was documented in CSC-STD-004-85.[3] Two relatively independent components of robustness were defined: Assurance Level and Functionality. Both were specified with a degree of precision that warranted significant confidence in certifications based on these criteria.
Evaluation[edit]
The Common Criteria[4] is based on this science and it intended to preserve the Assurance Level as EAL levels and the functionality specifications as Protection Profiles. Of these two essential components of objective robustness benchmarks, only EAL levels were faithfully preserved. In one case, TCSEC level C2[5] (not a MAC capable category) was fairly faithfully preserved in the Common Criteria, as the Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP).[6]Multilevel security (MLS) Protection Profiles (such as MLSOSPP similar to B2)[7] is more general than B2. They are pursuant to MLS, but lack the detailed implementation requirements of their Orange Book predecessors, focusing more on objectives. This gives certifiers more subjective flexibility in deciding whether the evaluated product’s technical features adequately achieve the objective, potentially eroding consistency of evaluated products and making it easier to attain certification for less trustworthy products. For these reasons, the importance of the technical details of the Protection Profile is critical to determining the suitability of a product.
Such an architecture prevents an authenticated user or process at a specific classification or trust-level from accessing information, processes, or devices in a different level. This provides a containment mechanism of users and processes, both known and unknown (an unknown program (for example) might comprise an untrusted application where the system should monitor and/or control accesses to devices and files).
Implementations[edit]
A few MAC implementations, such as Unisys' Blacker project, were certified robust enough to separate Top Secret from Unclassified late in the last millennium. Their underlying technology became obsolete and they were not refreshed. Today there are no current implementations certified by TCSEC to that level of robust implementation. However, some less robust products exist.
- Amon Ott's RSBAC (Rule Set Based Access Control) provides a framework for Linux kernels that allows several different security policy / decision modules. One of the models implemented is Mandatory Access Control model. A general goal of RSBAC design was to try to reach (obsolete) Orange Book (TCSEC) B1 level. The model of mandatory access control used in RSBAC is mostly the same as in Unix System V/MLS, Version 1.2.1 (developed in 1989 by the National Computer Security Center of the USA with classification B1/TCSEC). RSBAC requires a set of patches to the stock kernel, which are maintained quite well by the project owner.
- An NSA research project called SELinux added a Mandatory Access Control architecture to the Linux Kernel, which was merged into the mainline version of Linux in August 2003. It utilizes a Linux 2.6 kernel feature called LSM (Linux Security Modules interface). Red Hat Enterprise Linux version 4 (and later versions) come with an SELinux-enabled kernel. Although SELinux is capable of restricting all processes in the system, the default targeted policy in RHEL confines the most vulnerable programs from the unconfined domain in which all other programs run. RHEL 5 ships 2 other binary policy types: strict, which attempts to implement least privilege, and MLS, which is based on strict and adds MLS labels. RHEL 5 contains additional MLS enhancements and received 2 LSPP/RBACPP/CAPP/EAL4+ certifications in June 2007.[8]
- TOMOYO Linux is a lightweight MAC implementation for Linux and Embedded Linux, developed by NTT Data Corporation. It has been merged in Linux Kernel mainline version 2.6.30 in June 2009.[9] Differently from the label-based approach used by SELinux, TOMOYO Linux performs a pathname-basedMandatory Access Control, separating security domains according to process invocation history, which describes the system behavior. Policy are described in terms of pathnames. A security domain is simply defined by a process call chain, and represented by a string. There are 4 modes: disabled, learning, permissive, enforcing. Administrators can assign different modes for different domains. TOMOYO Linux introduced the 'learning' mode, in which the accesses occurred in the kernel are automatically analyzed and stored to generate MAC policy: this mode could then be the first step of policy writing, making it easy to customize later.
- SUSE Linux and Ubuntu 7.10 have added a MAC implementation called AppArmor. AppArmor utilizes a Linux 2.6 kernel feature called LSM (Linux Security Modules interface). LSM provides a kernel API that allows modules of kernel code to govern ACL (DAC ACL, access-control lists). AppArmor is not capable of restricting all programs and is optionally in the Linux kernel as of version 2.6.36.[10]
- Linux and many other Unix distributions have MAC for CPU (multi-ring), disk, and memory; while OS software may not manage privileges well, Linux became famous during the 1990s as being more secure and far more stable than non-Unix alternatives. Linux distributors disable MAC to being at best DAC for some devices – although this is true for any consumer electronics available today.
- grsecurity is a patch for the Linux kernel providing a MAC implementation (precisely, it is an RBAC implementation). grsecurity is not implemented via the LSM API.[11]
- Microsoft Starting with Windows Vista and Server 2008 Windows incorporates Mandatory Integrity Control, which adds Integrity Levels (IL) to processes running in a login session. MIC restricts the access permissions of applications that are running under the same user account and which may be less trustworthy. Five integrity levels are defined: Low, Medium, High, System, and Trusted Installer.[12] Processes started by a regular user gain a Medium IL; elevated processes have High IL.[13] While processes inherit the integrity level of the process that spawned it, the integrity level can be customized on a per-process basis: e.g. IE7 and downloaded executables run with Low IL. Windows controls access to objects based on ILs, as well as for defining the boundary for window messages via User Interface Privilege Isolation. Named objects, including files, registry keys or other processes and threads, have an entry in the ACL governing access to them that defines the minimum IL of the process that can use the object. MIC enforces that a process can write to or delete an object only when its IL is equal to or higher than the object’s IL. Furthermore, to prevent access to sensitive data in memory, processes can’t open processes with a higher IL for read access.[14]
- FreeBSD supports Mandatory Access Control, implemented as part of the TrustedBSD project. It was introduced in FreeBSD 5.0. Since FreeBSD 7.2, MAC support is enabled by default. The framework is extensible; various MAC modules implement policies such as Biba and multilevel security.
- Sun's Trusted Solaris uses a mandatory and system-enforced access control mechanism (MAC), where clearances and labels are used to enforce a security policy. However note that the capability to manage labels does not imply the kernel strength to operate in multilevel security mode[citation needed]. Access to the labels and control mechanisms are not[citation needed] robustly protected from corruption in protected domain maintained by a kernel. The applications a user runs are combined with the security label at which the user works in the session. Access to information, programs and devices are only weakly controlled[citation needed].
- Apple's Mac OS X MAC framework is an implementation of the TrustedBSD MAC framework.[15] A limited high-level sandboxing interface is provided by the command-line function sandbox_init. See the sandbox_init manual page for documentation.[16]
- Oracle Label Security is an implementation of mandatory access control in the Oracle DBMS.
- SE-PostgreSQL is a work in progress as of 2008-01-27,[17][18] providing integration into SE-Linux. It aims for integration into version 8.4, together with row-level restrictions.
- Trusted RUBIX is a mandatory access control enforcing DBMS that fully integrates with SE-Linux to restrict access to all database objects.[19]
- Astra Linux OS developed for Russian Army has its own mandatory access control.[20]
- Smack (Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel) is a Linux kernelsecurity module that protects data and process interaction from malicious manipulation using a set of custom mandatory access control rules, with simplicity as its main design goal.[21] It has been officially merged since the Linux 2.6.25 release.[22]
- ZeroMAC written by Peter Gabor Gyulay is a Linux LSM kernel patch.[23]
See also[edit]
- Attribute-based access control (ABAC)
- Context-based access control (CBAC)
- Discretionary access control (DAC)
- Lattice-based access control (LBAC)
- Organisation-based access control (OrBAC)
- Role-based access control (RBAC)
Footnotes[edit]
- ^Belim, S. V.; Belim, S. Yu. (December 2018). 'Implementation of Mandatory Access Control in Distributed Systems'. Automatic Control and Computer Sciences. 52 (8): 1124–1126. doi:10.3103/S0146411618080357. ISSN0146-4116.
- ^http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/history/dod85.pdf
- ^'Technical Rational Behind CSC-STD-003-85: Computer Security Requirements'. 1985-06-25. Archived from the original on July 15, 2007. Retrieved 2008-03-15.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^'The Common Criteria Portal'. Archived from the original on 2006-07-18. Retrieved 2008-03-15.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^US Department of Defense (December 1985). 'DoD 5200.28-STD: Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria'. Retrieved 2008-03-15.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^'Controlled Access Protection Profile, Version 1.d'. National Security Agency. 1999-10-08. Archived from the original on 2012-02-07. Retrieved 2008-03-15.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^'Protection Profile for Multi-Level Operating Systems in Environments Requiring Medium Robustness, Version 1.22'(PDF). National Security Agency. 2001-05-23. Retrieved 2018-10-06.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^National Information Assurance Partnership. 'The Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validated Products List'. Archived from the original on 2008-03-14. Retrieved 2008-03-15.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^'TOMOYO Linux, an alternative Mandatory Access Control'. Linux 2 6 30. Linux Kernel Newbies.
- ^'Linux 2.6.36 released 20 October 2010'. Linux 2.6.36. Linux Kernel Newbies.
- ^'Why doesn't grsecurity use LSM?'.
- ^Matthew Conover. 'Analysis of the Windows Vista Security Model'. Symantec Corporation. Archived from the original on 2008-03-25. Retrieved 2007-10-08.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^Steve Riley. 'Mandatory Integrity Control in Windows Vista'. Retrieved 2007-10-08.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^Mark Russinovich. 'PsExec, User Account Control and Security Boundaries'. Retrieved 2007-10-08.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^TrustedBSD Project. 'TrustedBSD Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Framework'. Retrieved 2008-03-15.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^'sandbox_init(3) man page'. 2007-07-07. Retrieved 2008-03-15.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^'SEPostgreSQL-patch'.
- ^'Security Enhanced PostgreSQL'.
- ^'Trusted RUBIX'. Archived from the original on 2008-11-21. Retrieved 2020-03-23.
- ^(in Russian)Ключевые особенности Astra Linux Special Edition по реализации требований безопасности информацииArchived 2014-07-16 at the Wayback Machine
- ^'Official SMACK documentation from the Linux source tree'. Archived from the original on 2013-05-01.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^Jonathan Corbet. 'More stuff for 2.6.25'. Archived from the original on 2012-11-02.CS1 maint: discouraged parameter (link)
- ^'zeromac.uk'.
References[edit]
- P. A. Loscocco, S. D. Smalley, P. A. Muckelbauer, R. C. Taylor, S. J. Turner, and J. F. Farrell. The Inevitability of Failure: The Flawed Assumption of Security in Modern Computing Environments. In Proceedings of the 21st National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 303–314, Oct. 1998.
- P. A. Loscocco, S. D. Smalley, Meeting Critical Security Objectives with Security-Enhanced Linux Proceedings of the 2001 Ottawa Linux Symposium.
- ISO/IEC DIS 10181-3, Information Technology, OSI Security Model, Security FrameWorks, Part 3: Access Control, 1993
- Robert N. M. Watson. 'A decade of OS access-control extensibility'. Commun. ACM 56, 2 (February 2013), 52–63.
External links[edit]
- Weblog post on the how virtualization can be used to implement Mandatory Access Control.
- Weblog post from a Microsoft employee detailing Mandatory Integrity Control and how it differs from MAC implementations.
- GWV Formal Security Policy Model A Separation Kernel Formal Security Policy, David Greve, Matthew Wilding, and W. Mark Vanfleet.
Retrieved from 'https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Mandatory_access_control&oldid=1012623904'
3 2 likes 39,760 views Last modified Sep 29, 2016 7:47 AM
Tips on 10.2 Jaguar, 10.3 Panther, 10.4 Tiger (10.4.4 is the beginning for some Intel Macs. On PowerPC Macs 10.4.11 is the end of Classic's compatibility), 10.5 Leopard, 10.6 Snow Leopard, 10.7 Lion, 10.8 Mountain Lion and 10.9 Mavericks,10.10 Yosemite, 10.11 El Capitan.
When determining which operating system you meet the requirements for, see this tip on Mac model and age:
Note this tip, and the related tips from Mac OS X 10.3 to 10.11 refer to Mac OS X Client. Mac OS X server questions more often are best answered by participants of the Server forums, as the limitations of Mac OS X Server can frequently differ.
Mac OS X Sierra, which was released September 20, 2016 is the first Mac OS X not compatible with any Macs running TIger. There are some Macs that came with 10.4 that can install up to 10.11.
Mac OS X 10.2 (Jaguar) or later require the correct firmware be installed. The Macs on this tip explain which do:
Mac Os Mojave
Additionally, those interested in updating to 10.4 may also benefit from 10.3 as well. See this tip to determine if you may want to consider it.
Be sure to backup your data first at least twice before installing any operating system. Shut down, and disconnect any peripherals before continuing with the installation. Read the info below to ensure you are compatible. Finally, you may need to use the Startup Manager to boot the operating system when the 'C' key doesn't work in order to get the installer to work or repair the disk before installation if the initial attempt to install fails. To determine if that repair is necessary, post to the forum, and someone will be able to help you to find out which repairs might be necessary.
If you are installing on a hard drive for the first time an operating system, remember to read this tip on formatting:
Macs that have 10.4.3 or earlier can't upgrade past 10.5.8. Macs that are G4 867 Mhz or greater (including 1 Ghz or greater), and G5 can be upgraded at least to 10.5.8. Firewire only Macs that are slower can only upgrade to 10.4.11. Intel Macs can at minimum upgrade to 10.6 if they have 1 GB of RAM. For more on your options, read on. Also the same Macs that came with 10.4.3 or earlier, also may benefit from not upgrading past 10.4.11, as Classic is not compatible with 10.5 and up. See this tip, to find out if you need Classic.
Compatible phones are listed here with 10.4.11:
![Towel Required! Mac OS Towel Required! Mac OS](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DGRv8dPVYAE7msb.jpg)
Compatible printers with 10.4:
Compatible printers with Intel Macs from 10.4.4 to 10.4.11:
10.4 users with Intel Macs, should seriously consider upgrading to at minimum 10.5.8 as a Flashback malware is currently only treated in 10.5.8, 10.6.8, and 10.7.3 and higher, though disabling Java can also help. For more info, read this tip.
Towel Required Mac Os X
Any Mac with a Firewire port such as is shown in the 3 ports on the image (two 6 pin Firewire 400 and 1 Firewire 800 are shown, though only one of those types of ports is needed) below,
and a DVD drive can boot into Tiger, until new releases came out October 26, 2007. The full requirements are here:
http://support.apple.com/kb/ht1514
http://support.apple.com/kb/ht1514
Tiger introduced Spotlight to replace the old Find File, for some Panther's Find File is sufficient, and this tip explains
what you can do to maintain most of Tiger's compatibility without having to upgrade to Tiger:
Mac OS X 10.4 (Tiger) came on several versions of retail installer DVDs that look like . If you still need Tiger over Panther, but do not like Spotlight, here's some alternatives:
http://www.devontechnologies.com/products/freeware/ - EasyFind
http://www.osxbytes.com/ - iFileX (note the MacUpdate link provided on osxbytes page has a Malware advertisement for MacKeeper, do not download).
There was a limited Media Exchange program
version of Tiger that came on similarly labelled CDs, which are hard to find but are useful for Macs that can't boot off internal DVD discs (since they didn't ship with a DVD drive, or obtaining a bootable DVD drive is difficult) or external DVD discs, but do have Firewire. Those Macs include some of the PCI Graphics PowerMac G4, and the Blue and white G3 tower Macs.
10.4(.0), (April 29, 2005), 10.4.3 (October 31, 2005), 10.4.6 (April 3, 2006) were all retail releases that did not say Upgrade, Dropin, or OEM. Though Intel Macs which started shipping with 10.4.4, can't take any of those retail discs, and must use the installer disc that shipped with them, until 10.5 (Leopard)'s release, at which point, they could use either a retail Leopard release, or the disc that shipped with them, until new Macs started shipping again December 15, 2008. If upgrading to an Intel Mac from a G3, G4, or G5, be sure to read this tip on migrating data. Also as part of the Intel Mac releases 10.4.5 to 10.4.11 (note 10.4.0, 10.4.1 are both older than 10.4.5) came in both PowerPC and Intel releases. Look at Apple menu -> About This Mac to determine if you have a G3, G4, G5 (all are PowerPC), or an Intel Mac. You can't
use the updater of one on the other.
Below is a table of 10.4 updates. Combo updates can be used on any preceding version of 10.4. including the update it is going to as long as updates not included in the combo were not applied. Delta updates only on the immediate preceding version. Note which ones below are for PowerPC (PPC) and Intel. Do not install a PPC update on an Intel, or vice versa.
10.4.1 Delta | 10.4.2 Combo Delta | 10.4.3 Combo Delta | 10.4.4 Combo Delta | 10.4.5 PPC Combo PPC Delta Intel Macs | 10.4.6 PPC Combo* PPC Delta Combo for IntelIntel Delta | 10.4.7 PPC ComboPPC Delta Combo for IntelIntel Delta | 10.4.8 PPC ComboPPC Delta Combo for IntelIntel Delta | 10.4.9 PPC ComboPPC Delta Combo for IntelIntel Delta | 10.4.10 PowerPC DeltaPowerPC Combo Intel Delta (version 1.1) | 10.4.11 Combo IntelCombo PowerPC Delta PowerPCDelta Intel |
Towel Required Mac Os Download
While Tiger's security updates are no longer maintained, you can download the latest ones made for it still from Apple's support knowledgebase.
Some Macs capable of having Tiger installed may benefit by having Leopard installed instead.
Read the tip below to find out if yours qualifies:
Also note, that iLife prebundled software started changing with Tiger. See this tip on what was prebundled and what wasn't:
Note also, Leopard removes Classic support, but not Mac OS X booting support for those that already had it.
![Required Required](https://img.itch.zone/aW1hZ2UvMzE3MDAvNTYzNTgzLmdpZg==/original/i8dNi8.gif)
See this tip to find out which Macs are able to boot into 10.5 and 9: